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[Vol, 5

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUST-PATIENT'S USE OF UNPAID

PHYSICIAN'S BILL IN SETTLEMENT WITH NEGLIGENT PARTY.-In

a recent District of

Columbia case, Woodruff v Coleman,' the court held that a constructive trust will not
be impressed in favor of a physician on the proceeds of a settlement between his patient and the negligent party where the physician's unpaid bill formed the basis of the
settlement. In 1950, appellant, Woodruff, was injured in an accident with a bus owned
by the Capital Transit Company Suit was filed against the company, but a settlement
was negotiated between the appellant's then attorney and the supervisor of the transit
company's adjustments. Before settlement, appellee, a phyisican, had treated appellant
over a period of several months, and had presented a bill for $1645 for his services.
This bill was used in negotiating the settlement. Subsequent to the settlement, appellant refused to pay the bill, claiming that it was grossly excessive. Appellee then filed
suit to have appellant declared constructive trustee for the full amount of the bill.
Appellee's motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits of the transit company's adjustments supervisor to the effect that the bill had been represented to be a
valid obligation of the appellant and as such had been included in the settlement, was
granted by the lower court. This judgment was reversed on appeal.
In reversing the lower court, the Municipal Court of Appeals cited the case of
Traywick v Wannamaker,2 a case with similar facts. The defendant in the Traywwk
case had previously recovered a judgment against petitioner for injuries caused by
negligent acts of the petitioner. In this action petitioner sought to have the defendant
declared constructive trustee of so much of that judgment as would be necessary to
pay the defendant's physician. Petitioner contended that suit was about to be commenced against her by the physician and that the amount of his bill had been recovered by the defendant against her. The court in that case found that in view of the
very small amount of the judgment it was highly unlikely that defendant had recovered the amount of the bill. The concurring opinion also stated that only the most
compelling reasons should force the court to sustain the petitioner's suit in view of
the very small amount of money the defendant would receive if that were done. What
the court in the Traywzck case would have done had it found that the defendant had
received the amount of the physician's bill in his judgment against the petitioner
cannot be known, of course.
But even had the Traywick case been decided differently, would the appellee in the
Woodrufi case be entitled to equitable relief? The constructive trust is a remedial
device in the courts of equity 3 It does not depend on intent of the parties but is
usually imposed contrary to their intention. 4 Professor Pomeroy said of such a trust:
"Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the
doctrine of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient manner, where
there is no intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in most cases contrary to
the intention of the one holding the legal title, and where there is no express or implied,
written or verbal, declaration of the trust."5

The courts have never fixed the limit of conduct which will give rise to a constructive trust. Their declarations have ranged all the way from requiring fraud, 6 to
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